creditors suffered a 40% haircut. Similarly, out of a total debt of $31.8 billion dollars, the Russians imposed a haircut of 37.5% with a participation rate of 98%. In the crises suffered by Ecuador (2000) , Ukraine (1998 Ukraine ( -2000 and Uruguay (2003) , the total outstanding debt was less than $10 billion dollars. In the restructurings that followed, there were no haircuts and participation rates were above 90 % (Porzecanski 2005 ).
Though it is clear that the haircut and the low participation rate of creditors in the Argentine is markedly different from earlier restructurings, there appears to be no clear understanding in the literature of why this was the case.
Commentators generally agree that the Argentine crisis was imminent following the governments wholesale adoption of the 'Washington Consensus' during the 1990's:
'eradication of inflation, the privatization of industry, the deregulation of the economy and the removal of trade barriers' (Blustein 2005, p 4) . 1 Others argue that the courts played a significantly different role in Argentina when compared with other debt settlements (Miller & Thomas 2007) . It is not surprising, therefore that there is very little agreement on what framework can prevent crises of this magnitude to occur in the future and to ensure fair and orderly settlements, if they do.
According to Paul Blustein, the IMF and global financial markets were complicit in the Argentine crisis, though this may not be true of the settlement. Historically, sovereigns have been forced to concede to the claims of minority creditors refusing to participate in debt restructuring. These holdouts or opportunistic creditors have successfully used the courts to delay settlements and obtain 100 per cent of their claims. Initially, this appeared to be the trend in the case of Argentine sovereign debt litigation, where
Argentina had to deal with repeated attempts by holdouts to stymie any settlement with 1 See Appendix for details of the events that led to the Argentine crisis in 2001.
the majority. However, the settlement proves otherwise: by offering to settle a majority of its debt, the debtor appears to have been in a better bargaining position than private creditors. Thus there appear to be different factors, such as the credibility and reputation of the IMF and informal, market-driven, governance structures that may play a significant role in future settlements.
The inadequate appreciation of these factors underlie the failure of Anne Krueger's framework: the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) modelled on Chapter 11, U.S. corporate bankruptcy proceedings (Krueger 2002a, b) . The SDRM as an official sector initiative is premised on a view that any possible market-driven solution would fail to ensure orderly and fair settlements instead of one that recognises the necessity of both.
In any event, Krueger's announcement divided discussions on the appropriate regulatory framework into two camps: one that favoured a market-driven framework through the modification of contract terms and the other that favoured an official sector interventionist framework like the SDRM. The latter was eventually rejected by market participants who finally settled on contract modification through the widespread adoption of collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign debt issued under U.S. law. 2 These bonds are discussed in more detail later in this paper.
In a recent paper, Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati (2007) set out the views of market participants on the change to CACs. The conclusions were surprising: CACs were viewed as being important but only at the margins. This view is in direct contrast with those that viewed CACs as the best tool to achieve the aim of fair and orderly debt settlements (Taylor 2002 To answer this question, we reveal the discourse amongst market participants on good faith. We specifically assess whether the Argentine case is really a 'tipping point' event in the life cycle of an evolving global norm (Finnemore & Sikkink 2005) . In the absence of a specific official sector description of good faith or a multilateral, regulatory framework to enforce a notion of good faith in sovereign debt, it is unclear how this notion evolves and the contexts that sustain it.
Section one situates the widespread adoption of CACs in a larger socio-economic and political context. This is followed by specifying how market participants choose to modify their behaviour in 'localised' contexts and thereby comply with notion of good faith.
Section three discusses how the U.S. courts involved in sovereign debt litigation have historically expected market participants to change their behaviour to comply with what we believe to be an evolving good faith requirement. Section four describes the process
by which an open norm evolves in 'localised' contexts. This is followed by our conclusions.
The adoption of CACs in the context of wider socio-economic and political change
In this section, we situate the widespread adoption of CACs in a wider socio-economic and political context to clarify the factors that can influence the aim of achieving fairer and orderly settlements in the future. We begin by describing sovereign bond documentation. We then go on to discuss the following changes. The diminishing role of the official sector specifically the IMF, the formation of regional political alliances, recent attempts by influential private creditors to organise around a set of rules outside existing official, organisational, structures, the changing nature of judicial intervention, and the phenomenon of low Argentine spreads despite its refusal to deal with existing holdouts. attempts by a debtor to restructure a majority of its debt (Miller and Thomas, 2007) . The authors claim that in the period leading to the swap, the U.S. courts played an unprecedented role in promoting the swap by engaging the debtor and aggregating the claims of diverse creditors.
Finally, the premiums on Argentine debt have been low . These low sovereign spreads reflect the indifference of global capital markets to its steadfast refusal to settle outstanding creditor claims.
This section articulates the changes that form the context in which the widespread adoption of CACs has taken place so far. This context is characterised by distinct and sometime unprecedented political and socio-economic changes. The next section specifies the localised contexts in which this new paradigm is articulated and in which a discourse of good faith can be situated.
Good faith: ' localised' contexts and compliance
This section describes the localised contexts in which market participants choose to modify their behaviour and thereby comply with a notion of good faith. 
Later that year, the IMF Board discussed the 'Good Faith Criterion' Under the Funding Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors (IMF 2002). This policy allows 'fund
lending into sovereign arrear to external private creditors…in circumstances in which:… and (ii) the member is pursuing appropriate policies and is making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors.' There is therefore clear evidence that the official sector also recognises good faith as a prescriptive norm.
This section reveals that good faith is not recognised as a legal rule nor do market participants expect the norm to be enforced on them at the time of the restructuring.
However, it is clear that market participants in 'localised' transactional contexts justify their expectations of changes in the behaviour of other market participants by reference to a notion of good faith. The following section examines how courts involved in sovereign debt litigation articulate the expectations of market participants in relation to good faith.
Good faith and the U.S. courts: setting the historical context
This section examines the reliance by the U.S. courts on good faith to justify judicial expectations of contractual behaviour in the context of sovereign debt litigation.
The CIBC Bank litigation is one of the earliest cases in which the notion of good faith In the litigation that followed, although the court rejected Banco Central's defences and upheld Brazil's move to block acceleration of the debt. The court observed that the plain terms of the contract required a majority vote to accelerate and that CIBC did not hold a majority of the outstanding debt. 9 Moreover, the court refused to imply an obligation of good faith and fair dealing on Brazil in order to invalidate Banco de Brasil's actions to block the acceleration. 10 Significantly, the court observed that the implied terms sought by CIBC would have the effect of impairing the rights of the parties and the ability of debtors and creditors 'to order their relationships through contractual debt agreements.' 11 Indeed the court expressly acknowledged that the provisions allowed Banco de Brasil to retain and vote its share of the MYDFA debt to hinder other creditors attempting to accelerate that debt.
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The court's ruling permitted the litigation seeking accrued and unpaid interest to proceed but barred acceleration of the debt. This effectively reduced CIBC's claimed damages from more than $1.4 billion to only $60 million. In this case, it is clear that in the absence of any clear malfeasance on the part of the debtor, the court would refuse to imply a notion of breach of good faith.
In contrast with earlier sovereign debt litigation, the Argentine cases explicitly allow for debt restructuring to proceed on the ground that the debtor is engaged in good faith attempts to restructure its debt and make a satisfactory offer to a majority of its creditors (1981) . Therefore, a black letter approach would view all contracts as being subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In this jurisdiction, 'good faith is a backstop duty intended to protect parties who do not have specific contract provisions to protect them' (Bratton & Gulati 2003, p.65) . Though, this good faith duty may be entrenched it has not been applied so broadly to corporate bond contracts in general (Bratton & Gulati 2003, p.66) and arguably not at all in sovereign debt litigation.
To support the argument that the actions of a debtor reflect a judicially recognised notion of good faith, one that is distinct from that set out in the Restatement one must first draw a distinction between different kinds of contracts and transactional contexts (More discussion on this distinction in the next section).
Sovereign debt contracts are commercial contracts and courts would therefore be wary of implying a good faith requirement 'ex post [as this] would be to frustrate their intent and add uncertainty' (Bratton & Gulati 2003, p.65) . However, in the context of other commercial contracts this has not stopped the courts from standing 'for the proposition that where a majoritarian modification occurs in a distress situation, includes an equal payout to all the creditors, and involves no side deal between the majority and the debtor, there occurs no violation of duties to the minority.' (Bratton and Gulati 2003, p.68) This reasoning matches the one taken by Judge Griesa in his affirmation that Argentina is involved in good faith negotiations with its creditors to resolve its debt crisis and therefore this must not be interfered with by opportunistic holdout claims of the majority. 13 The analysis of sovereign debt litigation in this section when compared with normal commercial cases reveals that the courts recognise the expectations that market participants have and that these are justifiable because of good faith.
Good faith in sovereign debt: the evolution of an open norm in 'localised' contexts
Good faith has been widely used in legal domestic jurisdictions especially the US, Germany and France. The identifying character of good faith is that the notion must be 13 Though this is not as far as Bratton and Gulati may be willing to go on account of the view that 'syndicated loan disputes do not translate easily to the context of a large sovereign bond issue.' examined in its broader social context, to identify the cultural explanations of its meaning. Two distinctions can be made in relation to good faith: one based on the domestic legal jurisdiction in which the norm is found and the other on the transactional context in which the notion is used. This section explores this distinction to specify a description of good faith conduct relevant in the context of a sovereign debt restructuring process.
Good faith in domestic jurisdictions
It is often not possible to apply any one notion of good faith in all domestic jurisdictions.
English law does not recognise a notion of good faith 14 comparable with the notion adopted and institutionally entrenched in Germany and as discussed earlier in U.S. law. (Teubner 1998 , Brownsword et al 1999 . In German civil law, the notion of good faith is closely allied to the indigenous notion of Treu und Glauben (literally: fidelity and faith) which eventually finds its way into section 242 BGB (Zimmerman & Whittaker 2000) .
Section 242 BGB 'specifies the way in which contractual performance has to be rendered and it gives rise to a host of ancillary, or supplementary duties that may arise under a contract: duties of information, documentation, co-operation, protection, disclosure etc. These duties can also apply in the pre-contractual situation and they may extend after the contract has been performed' (Zimmerman & Whittaker 2000, p. 24) .
Different notions of good faith are also used depending on the transactional context.
Thus in the literature a distinction is commonly made between commercial and consumer contracts (Wightman 1999) . It follows from this distinction that an enforceable or normative notion of good faith is applied to consumer contracts while arms length transactions are viewed as being regulated by a contextual notion of good faith. On 14 Though it is arguably the case that English law does recognise some notion of good faith account of the welfare implications associated with consumer contracts, courts will use the norm to impose terms on parties ex post.
A contextual notion of good faith is one where the courts recognise the tacit understandings between the parties at the time the contract is formed and leave the parties to negotiate contractual outcomes accordingly. The recognition that parties negotiating at arms length are sophisticated enough to arrive at outcomes consistent with the tacit understandings specific to their 'localised' contracting contexts respects autonomy and choice. The recognition of contextual good faith requires an interpretation that is not confined to the four corners of the contract in dispute. The contracting terms are important but only at the margins (Wightman 1999) .
Following from the nuanced descriptions of good faith in domestic jurisdictions, we can conclude that good faith in sovereign debt is not a legal transplant nor can it be described as a normative or enforceable legal rule. Good faith as the term has been used by market participants in the context of sovereign debt is an open norm. The content of the norm good faith cannot be established in an abstract manner but takes shape only by the way in which it is applied.
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Conclusions
This paper examined and analysed the changes in sovereign bond contracts, for instance, the widespread adoption of collective action clauses. These contract modifications were examined in the context of socio-economic and political changes that have taken place since the Argentine debt crisis in 2001 (and the settlement of 2005).
Despite being touted as the panacea of all the ills that have plagued sovereign debt restructuring in the past, market participants, especially creditors overwhelmingly believe that contract modification is important but only 'at the margins'. This paper set out to examine the mechanisms that will ensure fair and orderly debt workouts.
In the absence of a global, multilateral, regulatory framework for sovereign debt restructuring and the market rejection of the SDRM our examination of changes in the period leading up to the Argentine settlement and after, reveals that market participants rely on a contextual notion of good faith to do the job. This view is reflected in the judicial recognition of good faith.
Good faith in sovereign debt restructuring is an evolving open norm recognised in the localised contexts in which market participants interact. This evolving norm is not institutionally embedded and unlike the domestically entrenched version, is not a legal rule with specific requirements that needs to be fulfilled. In the context of its application in sovereign debt restructuring so far, good faith is conceptually similar to Treu und Glauben and section 242 BGB as recognised in German civil law. On the basis of our analysis we can say that the Argentine case does represent a 'tipping point' event in the life cycle of an evolving global norm (Finnemore & Sikkink 2005) . This is borne out by the ongoing orderly restructuring of Belize's debt, which in the process has become the 'first country in more that seventy years to use a [CAC]… to restructure a sovereign bond governed by New York law' (Beales & Chung 2007 ).
In the absence of a possible future shift to a normative and therefore enforceable notion of good faith, this paper has not examined whether market participants will comply with good faith or whether a contextual form of good faith can limit moral hazard. This paper has also not explored whether good faith can stem the desire for opportunistic gains that vulture funds have had in the past and which may still stymie debt restructuring in the future. We have also not engaged in a comparative analysis of other 'tipping point' events in other norm cascades in a global context. This paper establishes that norms evolve in the localised, transactional contexts in which market participants interact. This allows for an appreciation of these contexts and signals a shift from a regulatory paradigm based on the enforcement of contractual terms negotiated at the time bonds are purchased, to one that allows the tacit understandings of the parties at the time at which bonds are restructured to influence the financial terms of the settlement.
